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Abstract
According to d’Espagnat we must choose between nonlin-
ear breaks in quantum state evolution and weak objectiv-
ity. In this comment it is shown that this choice is forced
on us by an inconsistent pseudo-realistic interpretation
of quantum states. A strongly objective one-world inter-
pretation of linear quantum mechanics is presented. It is
argued that the weak objectivity favored by d’Espagnat
is, in fact, inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
1 CRITIQUE
If both Alice and Bob see a teapot on the table then
there is a teapot on the table. Or is there? In a re-
cent article [1] Bernard d’Espagnat contrasts “objectivis-
tic realism” (Option A) with an alternative theory of sci-
ence (Option B) close to Putnam’s “internal realism” [2],
which is close to Kant’s theory of science. According to
Option A, the antecedent (Alice and Bob see a teapot)
and the consequent (there is a teapot on the table) ex-
press two different states of affairs, such that the lat-
ter may be ontologically correlated, if not causally con-
nected, with the former. According to Option B, the
consequent is equivalent to the conditional statement “If
Cecily would look to see what is on the table she would
see a teapot.” This leaves no room for an ontological cor-
relation, let alone a causal link, between the antecedent
and the consequent.
According to Option A, the purpose of science is to
discover how things are in themselves, rather than how
they appear to us. According to Option B, science aims
to describe, as concisely as possible, the common (inter-
subjective or weakly objective) denominator of human
experience. There are sound arguments in favor of ei-
ther view. Science is driven by the desire to know how
things really are. It owes its immense success in large
measure to its powerful “sustaining myth” [3]—the belief
that this can be discovered. Neither the ultraviolet catas-
trophe nor the spectacular failure of Rutherford’s model
of the atom made physicists question their faith in what
they can achieve. Instead, Planck and Bohr went on to
discover the quantization of energy and angular momen-
tum, respectively. If today we seem to have reason to
question our “sustaining myth”, it ought to be taken as
a sign that we are once again making the wrong assump-
tions, and it ought to spur us on to ferret them out. A
retreat from Option A to Option B should be seen for
what it is—a cop-out.
Yet it takes only a millisecond’s reflection to realize
the naivity of the notion that the world as it is in itself,
out of relation to human minds or brains, is just like the
phenomenal world—the world as we humans perceive it.
The first lesson of science it that appearances are decep-
tive. On Option A, science peers beyond the phenomenal
world at the world as it is in itself. But the notion that
the world in itself is just like the world as we humans
do (or eventually will) conceive it, seems just as naive.
By definition, the world in itself has as little to do with
human concepts and theories as it has with human per-
ceptions. The “primary qualities” of Locke are as much
products of the human mind as are the “secondary” ones.
In response to this line of reasoning one may point
to “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the
natural sciences” [4] as the indicator of a kinship be-
tween the human mind and whatever is responsible for
the structure of the world in itself. This again may be
countered by pointing to our apparent inability to make
sense of quantum mechanics (QM) as a sign that we are
not all that well equipped mentally. However, these argu-
ments are metaphysical, and of metaphysical arguments
we ought to be wary, considering the “unreasonable inef-
fectiveness of philosophy” in the natural sciences pointed
out by Weinberg [5].
As a matter of fact, these metaphysical arguments are
beside the point. The question is not whether the world
in itself (assuming there is a way of making sense of this
concept) is like the world as we conceive it. The ques-
tion is not even whether QM compels physicists to for-
swear their “sustaining myth”. As physicists we are com-
mitted to discovering such ways of thinking about what
we experience as are consistent with Option A. It is not
within our purview to question our “sustaining myth”.
The question is not even whether unadulterated QM is
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consistent with Option A. The question is, which way of
thinking about unadulterated QM is consistent with Op-
tion A? We need to discover whatever deep-seated phys-
ical (rather than metaphysical) misconceptions stand in
the way of making sense of QM. It is these that we must
disavow. To renounce Option A in favor of Option B is
overkill.
The literature on measurement theory is so replete with
mutually supportive inconsistencies that it is difficult for
a critic to know where to begin. D’Espagnat rightly ad-
monishes us to
be cautious when using the notion of ‘state’,
which. . . has questionable metaphysical implica-
tions.
He observes that
if. . . we only worry about predicting what are
our chances of observing this or that, and if,
correlatively, we impart to the word ‘state’ no
other meaning than that of designating a math-
ematical tool allowing for such predictions, we
meet with no ambiguities whatsoever.
At the very least this should make one suspect that prob-
lems arising when quantum states are taken for more than
algorithms for assigning probabilities to the possible re-
sults of possible measurements, are pseudo-problems.
That a quantum state is such a probability algorithm is
evident from the minimal instrumentalist interpretation
of QM, which constitutes the common denominator of
all possible interpretations [6]. It is equally evident from
Jauch’s definition of the “state” of a quantum-physical
system as a probability measure resulting from a prepa-
ration of the system and his proof [7]—based on Gleason’s
theorem [8]—that every such probability measure has the
well-known density-operator form, which reduces to the
familiar Born probability measure if the density opera-
tor is idempotent. But if a quantum state is a proba-
bility algorithm, then it cannot also represent an actual
state of affairs. How could it? A probability algorithm
is one thing, an actual state of affairs belongs to an al-
together different category. This immediately disposes of
the “measurement problem” in its crudest form, which
treats the state vector as an actual state of affairs with
two modes of change, one governed by the Schro¨dinger
equation and another governed by the projection postu-
late.
What changes in these two ways is a probability mea-
sure, and this for reasons that are obvious rather than
mysterious. Probabilities are assigned, on the basis of
relevant facts, to possible events or states of affairs (in-
dicating possessed properties or values). They depend
(i) on the time t of the events or states of affairs to which
they are assigned and (ii) on the facts on which they are
based. They can therefore change not only in a “deter-
ministic” manner as functions of t but also unpredictably
with every new relevant fact. The successful completion
of a measurement is the relevant fact par excellence. If
the outcome of the measurement is unpredictable, as it
generally is, it has to be included among the relevant facts
on which probability assignments must subsequently be
based. The outcome being unpredictable, the basis of rel-
evant facts changes unpredictably as a matter of course,
and so do the probabilities that we assign on this basis.
It seems to me that d’Espagnat does not sufficiently
heed his own advice to “be cautious when using the no-
tion of ‘state’ ”. He refers to situations
in which the use of ‘realistic’ sentences—
involving the verbs ‘to have’ and ‘to be’—is both
harmless and convenient. This is when we know
(for sure) beforehand that, if we measured an
observable B on a system S, we would get eigen-
value bk of B as an outcome. In that case we
may assert that system S is in a state described
by one of the eigenvectors of B corresponding
to eigenvalue bk. . .
We may assert that the state |bk〉 is associated with S,
provided that all we mean by the ket |bk〉 is the Born
probability measures it defines. We may not assert that
|bk〉 describes the system and we may not assert that S is
in a state, for these phrases make no sense when applied
to probability measures. Nor can we say that B has the
value bk. This phraseology may be convenient but it is
not by any means harmless. It totally obfuscates the
ontological import of QM.
The first thing that needs to be understood about
quantum-mechanical probabilities is that they are as-
signed to conditional statements. If QM assigns prob-
ability 1 to bk at a time t then we are allowed to in-
fer that a successful measurement of B performed at the
time t will or would yield the result bk. Thus, if B is or
were successfully measured at t then bk will or would be
found. The transition from this conditional statement to
the blunt assertion that B has the value bk at the time
t is illegitimate because the value of t is defined by the
measurement, as the time at which B is measured, and
is therefore undefined if the measurement is not actually
made. Nothing warrants that blunt assertion except a
matter of fact about the value of B at the time t (that is,
an actual event or state of affairs that indicates the value
of B at t). As I have explained at length in Ref. [9], the
(contingent) properties of quantum systems are extrinsic
in the specific sense that they cannot be attributed unless
they are indicated by facts. No property is a possessed
property unless it is an indicated property. A position, in
particular, does not exist for S unless its possession by
S is indicated by an actual event or state of affairs. And
the same holds true of the time at which a property is
possessed. The time t does not exist for S unless it is
the indicated time of possession (by S) of an indicated
property [10].
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The state vector |ψ(t)〉, and the probabilities it assigns
to the possible results of possible measurements, depend
on a time parameter t. As long as probability assign-
ments are based on the same set of relevant facts, its
“evolution” is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation (or
suchlike). What is the meaning here of “evolution”, and
what is the meaning of the parameter t? Consider the
Born probability p (R, t) of finding a particle in a region
R at the time t. While few would think of this proba-
bility as something that exists inside R, many appear to
think of it as something that exists at the time t. The
prevalent idea is that the possibility of finding the particle
inside R exists at all times, so the probability associated
with this possibility also exists at all times and changes
as a function of time. Yet the possibility that a property-
indicating event or state of affairs happens or obtains at
the time t is not something that exists at the time t, any-
more than the possibility of finding the particle in R is
something that one can find inside R. And the same,
obviously, holds true of the probabilities associated with
these possibilities.
Neither possibilities nor probabilities are things that
subsist and change. To think of possibilities or proba-
bilities as if they persisted and changed (“evolved”) in
time (continuously and deterministically, as dictated by
the Schro¨dinger equation) is a straightforward category
error. It is this logical mistake that gives rise to the
somewhat gentler avatar of the “measurement problem”
which asks: How is it that during a measurement one of
the persisting possibilities (or worse, one of the chang-
ing probabilities associated with them [11]) becomes a
fact, while the others cease to exist? A silly question,
once you come to think of it, because possibilities aren’t
things that persist and probabilities aren’t things that
evolve. Saying in common language that a possibility
becomes a fact is the same as saying that something that
is possible—something that can be a fact—actually is a
fact. How can that be a problem? This non-problem
becomes a pseudo-problem if one forgets that there is
only one kind of actuality and misconstrues the common-
language “existence” of a possibility as a second kind of
actual existence that can be converted into the genuine
article by means of a measurement.
Since the probability p (R, t) isn’t something that exists
at t (anymore than it is something that exists in R),
the parameter t isn’t the time at which the probability
p (R, t) exists. p (R, t) isn’t a thing of which we can say
when it exists. A fortiori it isn’t something that can
evolve. Quantum-mechanical probability assignments are
conditional on the existence of a matter of fact about the
value of a given observable at a given time. p (R, t) isn’t
associated with the possibility that all of a sudden, at
the time t, the particle “materializes” inside R. It is
the probability with which the particle is found in R,
given that at the time t it is found in one of a set of
mutually disjoint regions (no matter which one, R being
one of them). The parameter t on which this probability
depends is the time of this actually or counterfactually
performed position measurement. It refers to the time
of a position-indicating event or state of affairs, without
which it is utterly meaningless.
The above quotation—“if. . . we only worry about pre-
dicting what are our chances of observing this or that”—
creates the impression that the only choice we have in
this regard is between (i) thinking of quantum states
exclusively as probability measures and (ii) considering
them also as warranting inferences to actual states of af-
fairs (such as the possession of a property by a system),
and that if we chose the former, we have nothing else to
worry about. While option (i) is, in fact, the only con-
sistent way of thinking about quantum states, nothing
could be further from the truth than the conclusion that
there is nothing else to worry about. This conclusion
is based on an erroneous identification of option (i) with
instrumentalism—the view that QM exclusively concerns
statistical correlations between measurement outcomes,
and that any attempt to go beyond these “brute facts”
is idle metaphysics. There remains so much to worry
about that we can’t afford wasting time and effort over
“solving” pseudo-problems arising from option (ii).
Back to d’Espagnat’s Note:
Similarly, when, as with the example of the
stone on the path [or the teapot on the table], we
know for sure that if we looked we would have
the impression of seeing a certain physical sys-
tem lying within a given region of space instead
of outside it, we are allowed to consider this
knowledge as enabling us to make some definite
statements concerning the quantum mechanical
description of this system. For instance, when
the system in question is an electron we are al-
lowed to infer from such a knowledge that the
state vector of the electron (or, better to say, of
the whole Universe including the electron) is an
element of a certain set of vectors.
Once again: There is no such thing as a quantum-
mechanical description in the sense intended by
d’Espagnat. All we know for sure is the statistical corre-
lations that exist between property-indicating facts (di-
achronic correlations between the results of measure-
ments performed on the same system at different times,
and synchronic correlations between the results of mea-
surements performed on different systems in spacelike
separation). The task before us is to draw ontological
inferences from these correlations while eschewing an in-
consistent mathematical realism that interprets some or
all of the mathematical symbols employed by QM as mir-
roring (representing, describing) the physical world, and
that allows inferences from quantum states to possessed
properties. If all we know for sure is that a position
measurement, if one were successfully performed, would
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indicate the presence of an electron in a finite region R,
we are not allowed to infer that the electron is in R. Nor
are we allowed to infer (from this knowledge) that a state
vector (rather than an “impure” density operator) can be
assigned to the electron. Nor is there a way of making
sense of the state vector of the universe. The values of
quantum-mechanical observables being extrinsic proper-
ties, they obviously cannot be attributed to the universe
as a whole.
D’Espagnat fails to make due allowance for the dif-
ference between mathematical realism (in the sense just
defined) and an “objectivistic realism” (to stick to his
term) that (i) allows perceptions of teapots to be corre-
lated with the existence of real teapots and (ii) holds that
science is in the business of discovering the truth about
things in themselves (including teapots). If mathemat-
ical realism were the only possible objectivistic realism
then Option B would quite arguably be the only way of
making sense of QM. But it isn’t.
The key issue is to find a way of thinking about
quantum-mechanical correlations that is consistent with
the existence of classical behavior at macroscopic scales,
and a common way of dodging this issue is to implicate
human consciousness or knowledge [12]. This may have
started with von Neumann’s principle of psychophysical
parallelism [13], according to which subjective percep-
tions correspond to objective (neural) processes. As far
as I can tell the principle is sound, but it tends to be used
in the wrong direction, by arguing from the definiteness
of observation reports to some sort of superselection rule.
It ought to be used instead to eliminate all references
to observations (qua conscious and/or intentional acts).
Nothing but confusion is created by dragging the myste-
rious relation between things and perceptions of things
into discussions of QM. This relation has nothing to do
with QM, for it exists between mental representations
and facts and is anything but statistical, whereas QM
concerns the statistical correlations that exist between
facts and facts. (The relation between things and per-
ceptions, by its very nature, doesn’t even fall within the
purview of the objectivistic paradigm, but precisely be-
cause it has nothing to do with QM, it doesn’t follow that
QM is inconsistent with Option A.)
D’Espagnat accepts the common point of view accord-
ing to which
the Schro¨dinger time evolution leads, for the
overall system S composed of S and the
pointer. . . to a state that is a superposition of
macroscopically distinct states; a result which
is incompatible with Option A.
The Schro¨dinger equation leads to nothing of this sort. It
statistically correlates property-indicating facts (prepara-
tions not of systems but of probability measures) with
property-indicating facts (measurement outcomes). It
governs not the time evolution of a state (in the common-
language acceptation of “state”) but the dependence of
probability measures on the time span between prepa-
ration and measurement. (Note that “preparation” and
“measurement” can be exchanged: Diachronic correla-
tions can be used to retrodict as well as predict, just as
synchronic correlations can be used to assign probabili-
ties to the possible results of Bob’s measurement on the
basis of the result of Alice’s measurement as well as vice
versa. Our sense of a directed time “flow” is irrelevant to
the interpretation of QM [14].)
A “superposition of states” is a probability measure
expressed in a form in which the probability amplitudes
associated with the possible results of a certain measure-
ment are explicit. It entails nothing but the wholly un-
problematic common-language “existence” of several pos-
sibilities. An inconsistency between “superpositions of
states” and the definiteness of observation reports only
arises if one commits the category mistake of thinking of
possibilities or probability measures as if they were facts
or as if they entailed anything factual. Then one has to
do some explaining. And the first question that arises
is: Are wave function collapses in the mind but not in
the world, or in the mind because they are in the world,
or in the mind and therefore in the world? There aren’t
any wave function collapses, but if one must choose then
d’Espagnat’s conclusion appears inescapable: If they are
in the mind because they are in the world then “in a
way or another the linear nature of the dynamics must
be broken” [15]. I heartily agree with d’Espagnat that
none of the schemes that materialize the break
is as yet considered, for various reasons, as being
fully convincing.
But this isn’t the fault of Option A and it doesn’t entail
Option B. None of those schemes is convincing because
there isn’t any “break” that needs to be “materialized”.
The actualization of a possibility is not a physical pro-
cess [16].
If adulterations of QM are rejected, the choice is be-
tween (i) only in the mind and (ii) in the mind and there-
fore in the world. The first option leads to the many-
worlds (or many-minds) extravaganza, the latter leads,
credibly enough, to Option B. If the premise is that sys-
tem S enters into a “state of entanglement” with appara-
tus A, then apparatus A enters into a “state of entangle-
ment” with Cecily’s brain as she takes cognizance of the
measurement outcome, and then the definiteness of ob-
servation reports combined with the principle of psycho-
physical parallelism spells collapse. Since it would be a
bit rich to claim that Cecily’s peep at the pointer causes
a collapse “out there” in the real world, divorcing the
subject matter of science from the real world “out there”
seems the proper thing to do. If science is concerned
only with the intersubjective (weakly objective) reality of
the “world as we know it” (to use Kant’s phrase), mind-
induced collapses make more sense.
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But this doesn’t mean that they make sense. A “state
of entanglement” is a probability measure just like any
old quantum state, except that it gives joint probabilities
for the possible results of possible measurements on more
systems than one. If a probability measure changes un-
predictably, it does so for reasons that are obvious rather
than mysterious, as explained above. If anything gets en-
tangled, it is possibilities, and if anything gets correlated,
it is probabilities. There isn’t any way of making sense
of an actual “state of entanglement”. Option B therefore
is just another gratuitous solution to a pseudo-problem.
There is nothing wrong with the philosophy behind Op-
tion B, except that it is irrelevant.
According to this trend of thought (considered
as being the most reasonable one by, perhaps,
the majority of contemporary philosophers), the
fact that we perceive such “things” as macro-
scopic objects lying at distinct places is due,
partly at least, to the structure of our sensory
and intellectual equipment.
True enough but, as I said, beside the point, for the real
issue is the ontological import of statistical correlations
between facts and facts. The nonstatistical correlations
between facts and perceptions have nothing to do with it.
(I would also contest the parenthetical claim. Putnam,
the erstwhile champion of internal realism [2], for one,
now considers the same philosophy “fatally flawed” [17].)
I grant d’Espagnat that dictionaries “define” facts in
terms that reek of Option B. The Concise Oxford Dictio-
nary (8th edition, 1990) “defines” “fact” as a thing that is
known to have occurred, to exist, or to be true; a datum
of experience; an item of verified information; a piece of
evidence. How else could it be “defined”? “Fact”, like
“existence”, like “reality”, is so fundamental a concept
that it simply cannot be defined. So what is the edi-
tor of a dictionary to do? The obvious thing is to fall
back on the metalanguage of epistemology. This shifts
the burden of definition to such terms as “experience” or
“knowledge”. Let’s look them up: Experience is an “ac-
tual observation of or practical acquaintance with facts or
events”. Knowledge is “awareness or familiarity gained
by experience (of a person, fact, or thing)” (italics sup-
plied). Which shows, if anything, that such terms as
“experience” or “knowledge” cannot be invoked to give
meaning to the word “fact”.
If “fact” is so fundamental a term that it cannot be
defined, the existence of facts—the factuality of events
or states of affairs—cannot be accounted for, any more
than we can explain why there is anything at all, rather
than nothing. (If something can be accounted for, it can
be defined in terms of whatever accounts for it.) Before
the mystery of existence—the existence of facts—we are
left with nothing but sheer dumbfoundment. In spite of
this, measurement theorists are busy trying to explain
the emergence of facts (a.k.a. “classicality”). The appar-
ent need for this wholly gratuitous endeavor arises if one
thinks of the possibilities to which QM refers, and/or of
the probabilities it assigns to them, as if they constituted
a self-existent matrix from which facts emerge—another
category error due to taking the quantum state for more
than a probability measure on the possible results of pos-
sible measurements.
Classical physics deals with nomologically possible
worlds (that is, worlds consistent with physical theory).
The question as to which of these worlds is real (agrees
with the actual world) is of historical rather than scien-
tific interest. Giving an answer to this question is strictly
a matter of observation. Does this imply that classical
physics makes sense only within a theory of science com-
mitted to Option B? Obviously not. In classical physics
the actual course of events is in principle fully determined
by the actual initial conditions (or the actual initial and
final conditions). In quantum physics it also depends
on unpredictable actual events at later (or intermediate)
times. Hence picking out the actual world from all nomo-
logically possible worlds requires observation not only of
the actual initial conditions (or the actual initial and final
conditions) but also of those unpredictable actual events.
Does this imply that quantum physics makes sense only
within a theory of science committed to Option B? If
the answer is negative for classical physics, it is equally
negative for quantum physics.
QM concerns statistical correlations between facts, and
the correlations warrant interpreting the facts as indica-
tive of properties. That is, they warrant the existence
of a physical system or systems to which the indicated
properties can be attributed. Suppose that we perform a
series of position measurements, and that every position
measurement yields exactly one result (that is, each time
exactly one detector clicks). Then we are entitled to infer
the existence of an entity that persists through time (if
not for all time), to think of the clicks given off by the de-
tectors as matters of fact about the successive positions
of this entity, to think of the behavior of the detectors
as position measurements, and to think of the detectors
as detectors. If instead each time exactly two detectors
click, we are entitled to infer the existence of two entities
or, rather, of a physical system with the property of hav-
ing two components. This property is as extrinsic as are
the measured positions. There is a determinate number
of entities only because every time the same number of de-
tectors click. Not only the properties of things but also
the number of existing things supervenes on the facts.
This ontological dependence of the properties and the
number of things on facts warrants the distinction be-
tween two domains, a “classical domain” of facts and
a “quantum domain” of properties that exist only be-
cause they are indicated (by facts). The impossibility
of attributing to the properties of the quantum domain
an intrinsic existence (or, equivalently, the necessity of
attributing their existence to the classical domain) com-
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bined with the apparent impossibility of understanding
the relation between the two domains within the objec-
tivistic paradigm, is the reason behind the frequent in-
vocation of consciousness in general and of Option B in
particular. If (i) the real world is the quantum domain,
and if (ii) the properties of the quantum domain depend
on the classical domain, and if (iii) the classical domain
can be neither defined nor accounted for by the quantum
domain, then the conclusion that the classical domain is
grounded in human experience is inescapable.
The second antecedent is certain. QM presupposes
facts from beginning to end—from the preparation of a
probability measure to a measurement. If the first an-
tecedent is accepted, the third means that the classical
domain isn’t part of the real world, and this leads to the
conclusion that the classical domain is “in the mind”. On
this view saying that the properties of the quantum do-
main exist only because they are indicated by what hap-
pens or is the case in the classical domain, is the same as
saying that the properties of the world exist only because
they are perceived—esse est percipere aut percipi. But
the real world isn’t the quantum domain. The real world
is the classical domain plus whatever properties of the
quantum domain can be inferred from the goings-on in
the classical domain. The third antecedent remains true,
inasmuch as the properties of the quantum domain are
defined and accounted for by the properties of the classi-
cal domain rather than vice versa. But it doesn’t mean
that the classical domain isn’t part of the real world. And
therefore it doesn’t follow that the classical domain is “in
the mind”.
2 STRONGLY OBJECTIVE
ONE-WORLD INTERPRETATION
OF LINEAR QM
So much for pseudo-problems and some of their gratu-
itous solutions. Before addressing some real problems I
would like to express my deep and abiding admiration for
the work of Professor d’Espagnat, whose numerous books
and articles (e.g., [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]) demonstrate
conclusively that no interpretation of QM that takes the
quantum state for more than a probability measure is
consistent with Option A. It is not the intention of this
Comment to belittle that outstanding achievement.
According to Feynman, the mother of all quantum ef-
fects is the two-slit experiment with electrons [25]. If
nothing indicates the slit taken by an electron then the
electron goes through both slits without going through a
particular slit and without having parts that go through
different slits. How can this be? That’s what I call a
problem. To my way of thinking, the origin of the prob-
lem is a mismatch between the spatial aspect of the world
and the way we all tend to think about it. Ask yourself
how you think about the empty regions L and R inside
the two slits. No doubt you will consider them different,
separate, distinct. Yet if they were distinct then either
the electron would go through a particular slit or it would
be divided into parts by its passage through both slits.
Hence if nothing indicates the slit taken by the electron
then those regions can’t be distinct for the electron, and
so they can’t be distinct per se. That’s what baffles us.
But think again. How are L and R different? You may
say, well, they are in different places; they have differ-
ent positions. So where are these different places? Your
answers will have the following form: “L is at/inside L”
and “R is at/inside R”, where L and R are shorthand
notations for whatever you say the positions of L and
R are. So where is L—the position of L or the region
containing L? It is clear that you are poised for an in-
finite regress. Your answer will have the form: “L is
at/inside L1”, where L1 is short for whatever position
you attribute to L, and so on.
The root of the problem is that we keep switching be-
tween two inconsistent modes of thinking. If we say “L is
at/inside L”, we treat L as a property (namely, the posi-
tion of L) and we treat L as a thing that has a property
(namely, the position L). If we then ask “Where is L?”,
we treat L as a thing to which a position can be at-
tributed. But we can’t have it both ways. Either L is
a thing to which properties (such as a position) can be
attributed, or L is a position—a property—that can be
attributed to things.
Hence our problem actually has an easy solution: Stop
thinking of positions and regions of space as if they were
things. L and R are properties that may or may not be
possessed. L—that is, the property of being inside L—is
possessed just in case there is a thing T inside L—a thing
that has the property L. We tend to think that saying
(i) “T is inside L” is different from saying (ii) “T has the
property L” because proposition (i) seems to imply that
L is a thing that contains T . But this is where we are
wrong. It is logically inconsistent to think of properties as
if they were things. L is not a thing, and proposition (i)
says exactly what proposition (ii) is saying.
Once we stop thinking of positions and regions as if
they were things, we are no longer bothered by the be-
havior of electrons in two-slit experiments. If an electron
goes (as a whole) through both slits, neither L nor R
is attributable to it, nor does it have parts to which L
and R are separately attributable. What is attributable
to the electron is L ∪ R, and since this is not a thing
that has L and R for its parts but a property, there is no
reason in the world why the possession of the property
L ∪ R should entail the possession of L, the possession
of R, or the existence of parts possessing the respective
properties L and R—no reason other than the fallacy of
thinking of space as if it were a thing that has parts.
The behavior of electrons in two-slit experiments forces
us to acknowledge a fallacy we have previously commit-
ted with impunity because the world of classical physics
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was consistent with it.
Once we commit this fallacy we end up thinking that
any finite region of space has infinitely many distinct
parts, and if we insist on thinking of all parts of space
as self-existent and intrinsically distinct, we end up with
the substantive, set-theoretic conception of space as a
manifold of intrinsically distinct point individuals (usu-
ally considered in one-to-one correspondence with triplets
of real numbers and denoted by IR3). I am not advocat-
ing that we should stop using IR3 as a mathematical tool.
But we must recognize it for what it is. We must learn
to think of the elements of IR3 not as things that have
positions but as positions that things may have. A “coor-
dinate point” P and “its position” are the same animal.
P is a position and therefore it does not have a position.
Only material objects have positions, and only those po-
sitions that are actually possessed exist, and only those
positions that are indicated (by facts) are actually pos-
sessed. The others exist solely in our imagination. It is
therefore necessary to make a clear distinction between
the set IR3 of all (exact) positions that a material object
may have, and the spatial aspect of the world—the posi-
tions that are actually possessed by material objects. It
won’t do to regard IR3 itself as adequately representing
the spatial aspect of the world.
Since no position is possessed unless it is indicated,
and since nothing ever indicates an exact position, noth-
ing ever has an exact position. A position measurement
can never distinguish between more than a finite number
of finite regions, and this is why attributable positions are
always finite regions like L and R. If we further take into
account that in order to specify the position of an object
we must say where it is in relation to another object that
serves as a reference point, we arrive at the conclusion
that space—the spatial aspect of the world—is the total-
ity of relative positions (or spatial relations) that exist
between material objects. This has a number of surpris-
ing consequences—surprising because they are at odds
with our deep-seated misconceptions about the nature of
space. For one, there is no such thing as “empty space”.
If there are no objects, there are no spatial relations, and
hence there is no space. A world without objects is a
spaceless world. For another, there is no such thing as
“the form of an electron”.
What is clear right away is that if an object without
parts—a fundamental particle like the electron—had a
form then this could only be the form of a point. If it had
any other form, it would have parts. Now try to imagine a
single pointlike object. As you imagine a pointlike object,
you also imagine a spatial expanse in which this object is
situated. You cannot imagine a point without imagining
a space that surrounds or contains it. A point is a form,
and the existence of a form implies the existence of space.
But you are asked to imagine a single pointlike object—
not any other thing, nor any of this object’s relations to
other things. Therefore you must not imagine its exter-
nal spatial relations. (The external spatial relations of an
object O are those between O and objects that have no
parts in common with O.) And since a pointlike object
lacks parts and therefore lacks internal spatial relations,
your mental picture must not contain any spatial rela-
tions. And since space consists of spatial relations, your
mental picture must not contain space. And since the
existence of a form implies the existence of space, your
mental picture must not contain any form. The upshot
is that the existence of a pointlike form is inconsistent
with the proper way of thinking about space—as a set of
spatial relations. A fundamental particle like the electron
therefore is a formless entity.
A possible way of giving QM in a nutshell is to say that
there are limits to the objective reality of our conceptual
distinctions. If an electron as a whole goes through both
slits then the distinction we make between “The electron
goes through L” and “The electron goes through R” is a
distinction that Nature does not make; it corresponds to
nothing in the world; it exists solely in our heads. Here
we are talking about spatial distinctions, but the same
is true of our substantial distinctions. What the two-slit
experiment is to spatial distinctions, a two-particle colli-
sion is to substantial distinctions. Suppose that initially
we have two incoming particles, one heading northward
and one heading southward, and that after the collision
we have two outgoing particles, one heading eastward and
one heading westward. QM tells us in unmistakable terms
that if the particles are of the same type (and their spins
are not antiparallel) then the outgoing particle heading
eastward is neither the same as nor different from either
of the incoming particles. The distinction between “E is
identical with N” and “E is identical with S” (where E
stands for the outgoing particle heading eastward and N
and S stand for the incoming particles) is another dis-
tinction that Nature does not make; it corresponds to
nothing in the world; it exists solely in our heads.
If we try to think of the properties that a fundamen-
tal particle possesses “by itself”, out of relation to other
things, we find that there aren’t any. The properties of a
fundamental particle are either relational (like positions
or momenta) or dynamical (characteristic of their inter-
actions, like charges) or comparative (like mass ratios—
the mass of a single particle has no physical significance).
Can we nevertheless say that two fundamental particles,
considered in themselves (and therefore out of relation
to each other) are distinct? Can we say that they are
two? According to the Identity of Indiscernibles, a prin-
ciple of analytic ontology which says that two things can-
not have exactly the same properties, the “two particles”
considered in themselves are two things only if they pos-
sess the property which philosophers call “thisness” or
“haecceity”. But the possession of this property implies
that the two particles in our collision experiment are re-
identifiable, and QM makes it abundantly clear that they
are not re-identifiable. Hence if two fundamental parti-
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cles are considered in themselves they cease to be two.
They become identical not just in the weak sense of exact
similarity but in the strong sense of numerical identity.
Then what is this one and the same thing X that every
fundamental particle intrinsically is? Since considered
in itself, out of relation to other things, a fundamental
particle has no properties, all we can say of an (existing)
fundamental particle in itself is that it exists. Hence
that which every fundamental particle intrinsically is, is
existence pure and simple. Let us call it “Existence” with
an upper-case E.
How is Existence related to space? Space contains—
in the proper, set-theoretic sense of “containment”—the
forms of all things that have forms. It does not contain
material objects over and above their forms; a fortiori
it does not contain the formless “constituents” of mat-
ter. Space exists between the fundamental particles; it is
spanned by their spatial relations. And since what exists
at either end of each spatial relation is Existence, spa-
tial relations are internal to Existence. QM tells us that
the physical world is both constituted by Existence and
suspended within it.
Ontologies tend to be modeled after the grammatical
relation between a subject and a predicate, and matter
tends to be identified with the ultimate subject—that
which is the same in things with different properties, the
grammatical subject by itself, bereft of predicates. But
matter also tends to be thought of as that which is dif-
ferent in things with the same properties. We ordinarily
proceed on the implicit assumption that identical things
come equipped with “thisness”, and for this property only
matter itself can be responsible. This way of thinking is
at the roots of the Platonic-Aristotelian dualism of Mat-
ter and Form and its subsequent transformations, includ-
ing the preposterous field-theoretic notion that physical
properties are instantiated by the “points of space” [26].
The nonexistence of “thisness” forces us to look upon
Existence, rather than upon the fundamental particles,
as the ontological equivalent of the grammatical subject.
The One is logically and ontologically prior to the Many,
which come into being when formless Existence enters
into spatial relations with itself and acquires, as a conse-
quence, the aspect of a multiplicity of formless particles.
Along with the particles, space and forms come into be-
ing, for space is the totality of existing spatial relations
(between Existence and Existence) and forms are partic-
ular sets of such relations.
The relations are logically and ontologically prior to
the relata—the fundamental particles. We are prone to
hold the opposite view—that spatial relations are sup-
ported by a self-existent multiplicity. In reality the mul-
tiplicity is supported by relations, which are supported
by Existence, which is one. QM describes a world that is
created top-down, by a process of differentiation, rather
than bottom-up, by a process of aggregation. (Saying
that QM describes the world is very different from say-
ing that some or all of the mathematical symbols of QM
describe the world. It takes a considerable amount of
thought to get from probability measures to their onto-
logical import.)
The world is differentiated both spacewise (spatial re-
lations warrant distinctions between “here” and “there”)
and timewise (temporal relations warrant distinctions be-
tween “now” and “then”). The temporal differentiation is
effected by change, for time and change are coimplicates:
A timeless world cannot change, and a changeless world
is temporally undifferentiated and therefore timeless. To
my way of thinking, the quintessential message of QM is
that there are limits to the world’s spatial and temporal
differentiation. The world is only finitely differentiated.
In an infinitely differentiated world, spatial relations are
determinate quantities; they possess definite values. In a
finitely differentiated world, spatial relations are indeter-
minate quantities; they possess fuzzy values, and so do
temporal relations [27]. The proper conceptualization of
indefiniteness requires the use of statistical concepts, and
this is why QM is formally a statistical theory.
The proper way of dealing with fuzzy quantities is
to make counterfactual probability assignments [9]. If
a quantity is said to have an “indefinite value” what is
really intended is that it would possess a value if it were
successfully measured, and that at least two possible val-
ues have positive probabilities of being found. (The coun-
terfactuality cannot be eliminated but it may be shifted
from measurements to fuzzy values: If a measurement of
observable Q is successfully performed on an ensemble of
identically prepared systems and the results have positive
dispersion, the value of Q would be fuzzy for an individ-
ual system S if the measurement were not performed on
S.)
So how do we get from fuzzy values or counterfac-
tual statements to unconditional statements of value-
indicating facts? No property is a possessed property
unless it is an indicated property. This seems to entail
a vicious regress, which at first blush looks like just an-
other version of von Neumann’s “catastrophe of infinite
regression”. The positions of detectors are extrinsic, too.
They are what they are only because of the facts that
indicate what they are. This requires the existence of
detector detectors indicating the positions of particle de-
tectors, which requires the existence of detectors indi-
cating the positions of detector detectors, and so on ad
infinitum. Generally speaking, the (contingent) proper-
ties of things “dangle” ontologically from what happens
or is the case in the rest of the world. Yet what happens
or is the case there can only be described by describing
material objects, and their properties too “dangle” from
the goings-on in the rest of the world. This seems to
send us chasing the ultimate property-indicating facts in
never-ending circles. Somewhere the buck must stop if
the ontological story unfolding in this section is to be a
viable interpretation of QM.
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To begin with, the following points should be kept in
mind. First, although the teapot isn’t only there when
somebody looks, it is there only because of the myriad
of facts that betoken its presence. If there weren’t any
actual event or state of affairs from which its position
could be inferred, it wouldn’t have a position, or else its
position wouldn’t have a value. (There is no need for a
conscious observer to actually carry out the inference.)
Second, as it stands the problem is still ill posed, for
we do not proceed from counterfactuals to unconditional
statements, nor do we start with valueless positions in
search of value-indicating facts. We proceed from facts
and the statistical correlations obtaining among them.
These correlations warrant (i) inferences to the existence
of objects with kinematical properties that have fuzzy
values and (ii) the interpretation of the statistically cor-
related facts as indicating possessed values.
Third, the “measurements” to which both the min-
imal instrumentalist interpretation of QM and Jauch’s
definition of “state” refer, are not confined to manipula-
tions that are intended to determine the value of a given
observable or that lead to the acquisition of knowledge.
The sufficient condition for a measurement is an actual
event or state of affairs that warrants the assertability of
a statement of the form “S has property p at time t”, ir-
respective of whether anyone is around to assert, or take
cognizance of, that event or state of affairs, and irrespec-
tive of whether it has been anyone’s intention to learn
something about S. Bohr insisted that quantum sys-
tems should not be thought of as possessing properties
independently of experimental arrangements [29]. His
insistence on the necessity of describing quantum phe-
nomena in terms of experimental arrangements [30, 31]
does not mean that quantum phenomena require the ex-
istence of experimental physicists. For “experimental
arrangement” read: the totality of property-indicating
facts. Any matter of fact that “is about” (has a bear-
ing on) the properties of a physical system, qualifies as a
measurement result.
Fourth, the extrinsic nature of the contingent prop-
erties of physical systems follows from the fuzziness of
their values, inasmuch as this requires the use of coun-
terfactual probability assignments [14]. The use of condi-
tionals with false antecedents would be gratuitous if the
antecedents were never true, for in this case the condi-
tionals could not be tested. But, in fact, the conditionals
are abundantly tested, for they express the statistical cor-
relations among facts that QM is concerned with, and no
experiment or observation has ever given the lie to QM.
This warrants the counterfactual use of the correlations
(that is, it warrants the assignment of probabilities to the
possible results of unperformed measurements), and this
is the formal expression of indefiniteness. But if the an-
tecedents of conditional probability assignments can be
false as well as true, there has to be a criterion for when
they are true, and this consists in the existence of value-
indicating facts.
Value-indicating facts are actual events or states of af-
fairs. Events are changes in the properties of objects;
states of affairs concern the properties of objects. These
properties are extrinsic; their possession is not factual per
se. Yet facts are per definition factual per se. The task
of resolving this apparent paradox is the genuine core of
the “measurement problem”.
The positional indefiniteness of an object O finds ex-
pression in the unpredictability of the results of position
measurements performed on O. Evidence of the indefi-
niteness of O’s position, or of the corresponding statis-
tical dispersion, requires the existence of detectors with
sensitive regions that are small and localized enough to
probe the range of values over which O’s position is dis-
tributed. (A detector is any object capable of indicating
the presence of another object in a particular region of
space.) The indefiniteness of O’s position cannot evince
itself through statistically distributed position-indicating
events if there are no detectors with sharper positions
and with sensitive regions that are smaller than the space
over which O’s position is distributed. But detectors with
sharper positions and sufficiently small sensitive regions
cannot exist for all detectable objects. There is a finite
limit to the sharpness of the positions of material ob-
jects, and there is a finite limit to the spatial resolution
of actually existing detectors. Hence there are objects
whose positions are the sharpest in existence. These
never evince their indefiniteness through unpredictable
position-indicating events. Such objects are entitled to
be called “macroscopic”. We cannot be certain that a
given object qualifies as macroscopic, inasmuch as not all
matters of fact about its whereabouts are accessible to
us, but we can be certain that macroscopic objects exist.
If the positional indefiniteness of a macroscopic ob-
ject never evinces itself through unpredictable position-
indicating events—the occasional unpredictability of the
position of a macroscopic pointer reveals the indefinite-
ness of a property of another object, not the indefinite-
ness of the position of the pointer—then it is legitimate
to ignore the positional indefiniteness of macroscopic ob-
jects. And if it is legitimate to ignore this—not only for
all practical purposes but strictly—then it is legitimate
to treat the positions of macroscopic objects as intrinsic.
The step from acknowledging the extrinsic nature of all
contingent properties to treating the positions of macro-
scopic objects as intrinsic is of the same nature as the
step from acknowledging the purely correlative character
of classical laws of motion to the use of causal language.
According to Hume [32], causality is in the eye of the be-
holder; it is our way of interpreting events, not a feature
of the events in themselves. QM has proved him abso-
lutely right. Macroscopic objects evolve predictably in
the sense that every time the position of such an object
is indicated, its value is consistent with all predictions
made on the basis of (i) all past indicated properties and
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(ii) the classical laws of motion. (As mentioned above,
there is one exception: Whenever the position of such
an object serves to indicate an unpredictable property of
the quantum domain, it is itself not predictable.) This
makes it possible to think of the positions of macroscopic
objects as forming a self-contained system of positions
that “dangle” causally from each other, and this makes
it possible to disregard that in reality they “dangle” on-
tologically from (supervene on) position-indicating facts.
The possibility of using causal concepts in the classical
domain implies the possibility of treating the properties
of the classical domain as intrinsic.
While correlations that are not manifestly indetermin-
istic (like those between the successive positions of a
macroscopic object) can be embellished with causal sto-
ries, in the quantum domain causal concepts are entirely
out of place [9]. Causality is a function of psychology, not
of physics. It is rooted in our self-perception as agents
in a successively experienced world. We can impose it on
the classical domain with some measure of consistency,
although this entails the use of a wrong criterion: Tem-
poral precedence takes the place of causal independence
as the criterion which distinguishes the cause from the
effect. But when we deal with correlations that are man-
ifestly indeterministic, projecting our agent causality into
the physical world no longer works. Trying to causally ex-
plain these correlations is putting the cart in front of the
horse. It is the statistical correlations that explain why
causal explanations work to the extent they do. They
work in the classical domain where statistical variations
are not in evidence. In this domain we are free to use lan-
guage suggestive of nomological necessity. But if we go
beyond this domain, we realize that all correlations are
essentially statistical, even where statistical variations are
not in evidence, and that our belief in nomological neces-
sity is just that—a belief.
By the same token, the possibility of treating the po-
sitions of macroscopic objects as intrinsic does not mean
that they are intrinsic. The world is spatially differen-
tiated to the extent that the values of spatial relations
are indicated by facts, and facts never indicate numeri-
cally precise values. Even the positions of macroscopic
objects are fuzzy [33]; therefore even they are extrinsic.
Yet their fuzziness exists only in relation to a backdrop
that is more differentiated spacewise than is the actual
world, a backdrop that exists only in our imagination.
Space—so we must keep reminding ourselves—isn’t an
intrinsically and infinite differentiated container of ob-
jects. It is a set of more or less fuzzy relations. Some of
these relations—those that obtain between macroscopic
objects—are the sharpest in existence, and these are not
fuzzy in any real sense; they are fuzzy only in relation
to an unrealized degree of spatial differentiation. Facts
that are indicative of the positions of macroscopic objects
are correlated in such a way (viz., predictably) that any
reference to them is superfluous: We can think of these
positions as intrinsic and as evolving deterministically,
and this for all quantitative purposes rather than merely
for all “practical” ones. The positions of macroscopic de-
tectors are not truly sharp, but as they are the sharpest
in existence we may treat them as sharp, as intrinsic, and
hence as per se available as possible properties of (things
in) the quantum domain.
Recall that attributing factuality (whether to a nomo-
logically possible world or to a measurement outcome) is
beyond the scope of any theory. When the theory has
done its part, we are left with the problem of attributing
factuality. And this problem has exactly one consistent
solution. The unaccountable factuality of facts belongs to
those properties which can be treated as intrinsic because
their indefiniteness exists solely in our heads.
3 REALITY VEILED AND
UNVEILED
Bohr felt that our interpretational difficulties “hardly al-
low us to hope that we shall be able, within the world
of the atom, to carry through a description in space and
time that corresponds to our ordinary sensory percep-
tions” [34]. While this is past the shadow of a doubt,
Stapp’s conclusion that “ ‘space,’ like color, lies in the
mind of the beholder” [35] is a non sequitur. This would
follow if a spatiotemporal description corresponding to
our sensory perceptions were the only possible descrip-
tion. But, as the previous section has shown, an en-
tirely different account of the spatiotemporal aspect of
the world is (i) possible and (ii) consistent with both
standard QM and Option A.
There is mounting evidence from neuroscience that vi-
sual perception and visual imagination share the same
processing mechanisms [36, 37, 38]. Hence as long as we
insist that science (which is in the business of construct-
ing theories or conceptual models of the world) provide
us with a model that can be visualized, we limit its scope
by the very brain mechanisms that are instrumental in
the construction of the phenomenal world—the world as
we humans perceive it. This is precisely what Option B
does. D’Espagnat seems to think that such a limit to the
scope of scientific inquiry is unavoidable, and he tries to
make a virtue of this perceived necessity.
I have here in mind a viewpoint that would be
totally faithful to the. . . scientific ideal of keep-
ing to what seems unquestionable within col-
lective human experience, namely the impres-
sions we share, without any admixture of pre-
supposed ideas concerning the actual existence
of the forms thus perceived. . .
The way in which the brain processes visual informa-
tion guarantees that the result—the phenomenal world
or “the impressions we share”—is a world of objects that
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are bounded by surfaces [39, 40]. The phenomenal world
conforms to the “cookie cutter paradigm” (CCP) accord-
ing to which the world’s synchronic multiplicity rests on
surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-
dimensional cookie cutters: The parts of any material
object are defined by the parts of the space it “occu-
pies”, and the parts of space are defined by delimiting
and separating surfaces. This seems self-evident because
this is how we perceive the world because this is how the
brain analyses visual information.
As long as we take the parts of matter to be defined by
the parts of space, the parts of space are logically prior
to the parts of matter; hence they exist independently of
matter; hence space is a thing that has parts. Another,
probably similarly hard-wired misconception is that parts
exist by themselves (rather than by virtue of some process
of division or differentiation) or that multiplicity (rather
than One Existence) is fundamental. Combining these
misconceptions leads to the idea that all (conceivable)
parts of space exist by themselves and to the concept of
space as a manifold of intrinsically distinct point individ-
uals.
If the world were created along the lines laid down
by the CCP, the shapes of things would be bounding
surfaces, and matter would be an extended stuff bounded
by surfaces. A material object would have as many parts
as the space it occupies, and an object without parts—a
particle like the electron—would be a bit of stuff with
the form of a point. Extended material objects would
always occupy distinct parts of space, and the positions
of pointlike objects would always be distinct. Material
objects would be re-identifiable since at every time there
would be a fact of the matter concerning which is which.
If we subscribe to the “scientific ideal of keeping
to. . . the impressions we share”, we remain committed to
the CCP, and this, clearly, leads us up the garden path.
It implies the substantive conception of space as a man-
ifold of intrinsically distinct point individuals while QM
tells us that space is a set of relations between material
objects. It implies that the shapes of things are points
or bounding surfaces while QM tells us they are sets of
spatial relations. It implies that electrons are pointlike
while QM tells us they are formless. It implies that parti-
cles are re-identifiable while QM tells us they are not. It
further implies that the world is infinitely differentiated
spacewise and timewise while QM tells us that it is only
finitely differentiated; that spatial relations are determi-
nate quantities while QM tells us they are fuzzy; that
the world is created bottom-up by aggregation while QM
tells us it is created top-down by differentiation.
The upshot is that QM is inconsistent with Option B.
Option B commits us to the CCP, and every one of the
implications of the CCP directly contradicts what QM
is trying to tell us. D’Espagnat concludes that we must
either accept breaks in the linear evolution of quantum
states or
grant that man-independent reality. . . is some-
thing more “remote from anything ordinary hu-
man experience has access to” than most scien-
tists were up to now prepared to believe. . .
I fully agree with this conclusion. The world according
to QM, as outlined in Sec. 2, is more remote from any-
thing ordinary human experience has access to than most
scientists were up to now prepared to believe. But this
does not mean that we cannot understand it. I entirely
disagree with his claim that
while, through physics, Being informs us quite
definitely of what it is not. . . it seems reluctant
at letting us know what it truly is.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Reality does not
veil itself [21]. It is we who veil it, by clinging to (i) con-
cepts of space, time, form, and substance that are inappli-
cable to the physical world and (ii) pseudo-realistic ways
of thinking about probability measures. Once these mis-
conceptions are replaced by adequate ways of thinking,
everything is above board. Nothing remains mysterious,
except the mother of all mysteries—why there is anything
at all, rather than nothing. As Wittgenstein said in the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus : “Not how the world is,
is the mystical, but that it is.” QM refers to this mystery
twice: when it presupposes the unaccountable factuality
of facts, and when it tells us that intrinsically each fun-
damental particle is existence pure and simple. These
aperc¸us of “bare reality” play distinct ontological roˆles.
While the factuality of facts is the ultimate reason why
there are properties, Existence is the ultimate reason why
there are things that have properties.
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